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Abstract
Many terminals are used in safety-critical operations in
which humans, through terminal user interfaces, become
a part of the system control loop (e.g., medical and in-
dustrial systems). These terminals are typically embed-
ded, single-purpose devices with restricted functionality,
sometimes air-gapped and increasingly hardened.
We describe a new way of attacking such terminals
in which an adversary has only temporary, non-invasive,
physical access to the terminal. In this attack, the adver-
sary attaches a small device to the interface that connects
user input peripherals to the terminal. The device exe-
cutes the attack when the authorized user is performing
safety-critical operations, by modifying or blocking user
input, or injecting new input events.
Given that the attacker has access to user input, the
execution of this attack might seem trivial. However,
to succeed, the attacker needs to overcome a number of
challenges including the inability to directly observe the
user interface and avoid being detected by the users. We
present techniques that allow user interface state and in-
put tracking. We evaluate these techniques and show that
they can be implemented efficiently. We further evalu-
ate the effectiveness of our attack through an online user
study and find input modification attacks that are hard for
the users to detect and would therefore lead to serious vi-
olations of the input integrity.
1 Introduction
Many embedded terminals are used for safety-critical
operations. For example, doctors program medical im-
plants (e.g., Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs) and pace-
makers) using dedicated terminals. At industrial facili-
ties, the operation of automated devices, such as assem-
bly robots and process control systems, are adjusted from
control terminals. If the adversary manages to modify
Figure 1: Examples of safety-critical terminals.
the operation of such terminals at a critical moment, the
consequences can be severe.
In contrast to general-purpose PC and smartphone
platforms, these terminals are single-purpose devices
with stripped-down functionality, and often hardened se-
curity. The terminals run operating system versions, such
as Embedded Linux and Windows Embedded, that are
smaller in size than general-purpose systems and can be
configured to support relevant features only. The termi-
nals are typically disconnected from the Internet and in-
stallation of third-party applications from external me-
dia is often not enabled. The Windows Embedded plat-
form supports verification of the software configuration
at boot and allows to be configured such that only signed
software can be run (AppLocker feature) [10]. The ter-
minals typically run only a single UI application that is
executed with least privileges. In such an environment,
the user cannot modify the terminal settings besides what
the application UI enables, in particular he cannot exe-
cute programs with administrative privileges.
Attacking such hardened terminals can be more chal-
lenging compared to general-purpose systems. Remote
attacks over the Internet might not be possible if the ter-
minals are air-gapped. If the adversary obtains tempo-
rary physical access, he cannot easily install malware,
as installation and execution of unsigned software may
be prevented. A sophisticated attacker might be able to
physically inject malicious code to the memory of the ter-
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minal at runtime, but such invasive attacks are elaborate
to mount and may require expensive equipment.
Another attack vector for such terminals is through
their user interfaces. For example, many medical devices
do not implement user authentication (password checks),
as doctors must be able to operate them at all times. If
the adversary can briefly access an unattended terminal,
he can change its settings from the user interface. The
attack is quick and non-invasive, but easier to notice and
less severe compared to a runtime attack where the ad-
versary modifies the operation of the terminal during its
use (e.g., a doctor configuring an implant). Such attacks
can also be prevented by mandating user authentication.
In this paper, we describe a novel way to attack safety-
critical terminals through their user interface. Our ap-
proach violates the integrity of user input when the termi-
nal is operated by the legitimate user, causing very dam-
aging and stealthy runtime attacks without any malware
running on the terminal.
In the attack, the adversary gains temporary physical
access to a terminal, attaches a small attack device to it,
and leaves the location. The attack device is attached to
an interface that connects a user input device to the termi-
nal. For example, the adversary can attach the attack de-
vice to a USB port that connects a mouse to the terminal
or to an interface that connects an integrated touch screen
to the terminal mainboard. The attack device observes
the communication from the input device and when the
legitimate user is performing a safety-critical operation,
the device launches the attack by injecting new user input
events. The attack can result in a serious safety violation,
even loss of a human life, and the user is let to believe
that he accidentally caused the damage himself.
The attack requires only brief and non-invasive access
to the terminal. For example, attaching a small device to
the USB port takes only a few seconds. A small attack
device can be difficult to notice, and to a malware detec-
tion system the attack is invisible, as no malicious code is
running on the terminal itself. The attack is also agnostic
to any applied user authentication. The only chance to
detect the attack is that the user notices the subtle visual
changes on the user interface when the attack is active
(e.g., medical device settings are modified). However,
the attack can be made very fast and most people do not
notice minor visual changes [16].
Although the adversary has access to user input, real-
izing the attack involves technical challenges:
• Embedded terminals accept constrained user input
and they do not allow admin access.
• The attack device operates “blindly” as it cannot ob-
serve the state of the UI or possible pointer location.
• The users may notice input modifications or inser-
tion, such as value change or pointer displacement.
To address them, we developed a novel state tracking
algorithm that estimates the most likely system state and
designed attack launch techniques that give little visual
indication to the user. Our attack is invisible to traditional
malware detection, it operates under a limited view of the
target system without any feedback from the system, and
it gives little visual indication to the user — we call it
hacking in the blind.
We used the user interface of a medical implant pro-
grammer to evaluate our attack techniques, but we em-
phasize that our approach is applicable to a wide range
of target systems from general-purpose PC platforms to
hardened embedded terminals and different user input
methods. Our evaluation shows that our algorithm can
accurately determine the current state of the terminal. We
tested UI manipulation techniques on 987 online study
participants and noticed that our attacks can be very hard
to detect: the attack success rate for the most stealthy
variant was 93-96%. We analyzed possible countermea-
sures and note that all of them have limitations. We con-
clude that our attack presents a serious threat to many
embedded terminals.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• New way to attack safety-critical terminals. We pro-
pose an attack that is quick to deploy, hard for users
to notice, and invisible to existing malware detec-
tion.
• New attack techniques. We developed a novel al-
gorithm that estimates the most likely state of the
target system based on the observed user inputs and
UI manipulation techniques that provide little visual
indication to the user.
• Analysis of protective measures. We analyze possi-
ble countermeasure and point out their limitations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we explain the attack scenario. We describe our
attack techniques in Section 3 and evaluate them in Sec-
tion 4. We analyze countermeasures in Section 5. Sec-
tion 6 provides discussion, Section 7 reviews related
work and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Attack Scenario
We consider a scenario where the adversary has brief
physical access to the target system. For example, in
hospitals visitors can enter patient rooms where medical
terminals are kept and in industrial facilities the cleaning
personnel routinely has access to safety-critical control
terminals.
In our attack, the adversary attaches a small attack de-
vice that sits in-between a user input device and the ter-
minal (Figure 2). If the input device is integrated into
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Figure 2: Attack scenario. The adversary attaches an
attack device to an interface that connects a user input
device to the terminal. The adversary can also replace a
user input device with a malicious one.
the terminal device (e.g., touchscreen), the adversary at-
taches the attack device to an interface that connects the
input device to the terminal mainboard. This may require
opening the terminal enclosure. If the input device is an
external device (e.g., USB mouse), the adversary can at-
tach the attack device to the USB port that connects the
device to the terminal. The adversary can also simply re-
place an external input device with one that contains the
attack device. Such operations are quick to perform.
The installed attack device observes user events from
the connected input device and launches the attack by
modifying user input or injecting new input events when
the legitimate user is performing a safety-critical opera-
tion. Such attacks are the most severe in many scenarios.
A likely outcome of the attack is that the user would
believe that he caused the damage himself. Forensic
analysis would also reveal a set of user inputs that lead
to the accident, without any evidence of malware running
on the device. Once the attack is done, the adversary can
retrieve the attack device to remove evidence.
Target system assumptions. The target safety-critical
system is an embedded terminal that runs a stripped-
down operating system with hardened security. Here we
describe protective measures (Lockdown features) avail-
able on the Windows Embedded Industry platform [10],
but similar security enhancements are commonly avail-
able on embedded Linux distributions as well.
The terminal is a single-application system where
the application user interface occupies the entire device
screen. The terminal can be configured to run only one
application (AppLocker feature). The user cannot escape
the application UI with a specific key sequence (Key-
board Filter), and thus the user can only interact with the
terminal through the application UI. The application is
executed with least user privileges (User Account Con-
trol). We assume that the terminal is disconnected from
the Internet. Installation of third-party software from ex-
ternal media is not allowed, and the terminal can verify
its software configuration at boot and start only signed
software at runtime (AppLocker). The terminal can be
configured to only connect to USB devices with known
class, device and product identifiers (USB Filter). Addi-
tionally, the entire terminal memory can be scanned for
malware periodically. Side-channels, such as power con-
sumption analysis, can be used to identify (malicious)
processes running on the terminal [4].
When the terminal is booted, its execution always be-
gins from the same state. The application user inter-
face is deterministic: similar interaction always causes
the same result (e.g., state transition or remaining in the
same state). The terminal is used via touchscreen, mouse
or keyboard.
Adversary capabilites. We assume that the adversary
can physically install the attack device unnoticed. Be-
sides installing the attack device, the adversary does not
interact with the terminal in any other way. In particular,
we assume that the adversary does not reboot the termi-
nal and that the adversary cannot observe its current state
(the user interface of some terminals might be locked
and password protected). The adversary can make the at-
tack device so small that legitimate users do not notice its
presence. If the device is used via two input devices (e.g.,
mouse and keyboard), the adversary can connect both of
them to the same attack device. The attack device can
observe, delay, and block all events from the connected
user input devices as well as inject new events. After
the installation, the attack device does not communicate
with the remote adversary. After the attack, the adver-
sary may collect the attack device. The adversary knows
the user interface of the terminal, including its states and
state transitions.
3 Hacking in the Blind
In our attack scenario, the adversary gains temporary ac-
cess to the target terminal, attaches the attack device to
it and leaves the location. The next time when the legit-
imate user operates the terminal, the attack device starts
observing user input events. The attack device can in-
tercept all events, but their interpretation may have two
forms of uncertainty.
First, the adversary may not know the state of the ter-
minal user interface, e.g., because the user interface of
the terminal was locked when the attack device was in-
stalled. We call this state uncertainty. Second, the adver-
sary may not be able to interpret all received user input
events without ambiguity. In particular, mouse events
are relative to the mouse cursor location that may be
unknown to the adversary. We call this location uncer-
tainty. In contrast to mouse input, touchscreen events do
not have location uncertainty.
The goal of the adversary is to attack the terminal
through its user interface when the legitimate user is per-
forming a safety-critical operation. The primary chal-
lenge is to launch the attack accurately under such un-
certainty, without any feedback from the target terminal
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(hacking in the blind). The best attack strategy depends
on the usage of the terminal, the type of the input device,
the user interface configuration, and the level of stealth-
iness the adversary wants to achieve. We explore attack
strategies from simple techniques and to more challeng-
ing scenarios that require more sophisticated solutions.
3.1 Simple Techniques
If the adversary manages to reduce (or remove) both lo-
cation and state uncertainty, attacking the terminal user
interface becomes easier. Assuming that the adversary
knows both the current user interface state and the mouse
cursor location, each received event can be interpreted
unambiguously. An adversary that knows the user in-
terface can easily track both mouse movement and state
transitions in the user interface. Below we list methods
that can help the adversary to reduce uncertainty.
Reducing state uncertainty. A simple technique to
learn the state of the system is to wait for a reboot. If the
attack device can determine when the terminal is booted,
it knows that, shortly after, the terminal user interface
is in a known state. This technique works only if the
target terminal is rebooted before the attack. While some
safety-critical terminals may be shut down after each use,
others may run long periods of time without reboots.
The technique has also another possible limitation.
The user might create input events, such as mouse clicks,
during the terminal boot process. Depending on the im-
plementation of the terminal, the attack device may not
know when exactly the user input device driver has been
fully initialized, the application is started, and the termi-
nal OS starts passing the incoming events to the applica-
tion user interface. If the user clicks the mouse during
the boot, the adversary might not be able to determine if
the clicks reached the application and caused a state tran-
sition in its user interface. The adversary could address
this by blocking events during boot.
Another simple technique is to wait for specific input
event sequences. For example, if the terminal user in-
terface has an editable text field in one state only, text
input received from the keyboard is an indication that the
terminal user interface is currently in that state.
This technique has two limitations. First, in many user
interfaces there are no user input event sequences that
identify the state precisely (e.g., editable text fields in
several states). Second, even if the user interface config-
uration has an event sequences that identifies the state,
the sequence may not manifest in every usage of the ter-
minal (e.g., no text input every time).
Reducing location uncertainty. A simple technique
to determine the mouse cursor location is to actively
move the mouse (i.e., inject movement events) towards a
corner of the screen. For example, if the mouse is moved
Figure 3: Attack system overview. On the attack device,
a state tracking component processes observed user input
events with respect to a UI model and produces a state es-
timate. The attack is launched based on the state estimate
and the UI model by blocking and injecting new events.
up and left sufficiently, the adversary knows with cer-
tainty that the mouse cursor is located at the top-left cor-
ner of the screen. Moving the mouse while the system
is idle may not be possible, if the terminal user interface
is locked. To make the above process appear less sus-
picious during terminal use, the adversary can create an
appearance that the user moved the mouse herself. For
example, when the attack device observes mouse move-
ment events left and up, it can inject additional move-
ment events to the same direction. The process mimics
a situation where the mouse movement was accelerated
and the user unintentionally moved the mouse cursor to
corner of the screen herself. The limitation of this tech-
nique is that if such mouse movement is performed re-
peatedly (e.g., at every boot), it can appear suspicious to
an anomaly detection system or post-attack forensics.
Waiting for a reboot is another possible way to learn
the mouse location. Typically, the mouse cursor is placed
at the same location on the screen after boot. The above
discussed limitations apply also to this technique. The
user might move the mouse during the boot process
which makes it harder to tell where the mouse cursor is
after the boot.
We take a practical stand and assume that in many sce-
narios the adversary has to perform the attack under loca-
tion uncertainty, state uncertainty or both. The case with
both location and state uncertainty is the most challeng-
ing to attack and, to us, the most interesting.
3.2 Attacks Under Uncertainty
Starting from this section, we describe a novel attack sys-
tem that enables the adversary to launch accurate attacks
despite of uncertainty. A noteworthy property of the sys-
tem is that it estimates user interface state and mouse lo-
cation fully passively, and thus enables implementation
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Figure 4: Example user interface model. The model in-
cludes user interface states, user input elements and state
transitions. The attack state contains attack elements and
a confirmation element.
of stealthy and precise attacks. We proceed by giving a
high-level overview of the attack system (Figure 3).
The attack device contains a static model of the target
system user interface that the adversary constructed be-
fore the device deployment and it runs two main software
components. The first component is a State and Location
Estimator that determines the most likely user interface
state (and mouse cursor location) based on the observed
user events and the UI model. The estimation process can
begin from a known, or an unknown user interface state,
at an arbitrary moment and it tracks mouse, keyboard and
touchscreen events. The second component is an Attack
Launcher that performs active UI manipulation when the
legitimate user is performing a safety-critical operation.
We describe several attack variants and evaluate their de-
tection through a user study (Section 4).
3.3 User Interface Model
The user interface model (see Figure 4) contains user in-
terface states, their user input elements and state tran-
sitions. User input elements are buttons, editable text
fields, multiple choice elements, movable sliders etc. All
input elements can be interacted with mouse and touch-
screen devices. Some user input elements can be inter-
acted with a keyboard device.
For each state, the model includes the locations and the
types of the user input elements and the possible state
transition that the element triggers. The transitions are
deterministic. One of the states is defined as the start
state and one or more states are defined as the target
states. The goal of the attack is to modify safety-critical
input elements (target elements) on the target states. Typ-
ically the target state includes also a confirmation ele-
ment that the user clicks to confirm the safety-critical
operation.
3.4 State and Location Estimation
Here we describe our state and location estimation algo-
rithm for mouse and keyboard (both location and state
Figure 5: Our algorithm maintains a list of state trackers.
On each click it creates child trackers for every tracker
and removes the parent from the list.
uncertainty). Later we explain how the same algorithm
can be used to estimate state for touchscreen input (only
state uncertainty).
The algorithm operates by keeping track of all possi-
ble user interface state and mouse location combinations.
For each possible state and location the algorithm main-
tains a state tracker object. The state trackers contain
an identifier of the state and an uncertainty area that de-
termines the possible location of the mouse in that state
instance. Additionally, the algorithm assigns a probabil-
ity for each tracker object that represent the likelihood
that the terminal user interface and the mouse cursor are
in this state and location.
The estimation algorithm maintains the tracker objects
in a list (Figure 5). If the estimation begins from a known
state, we have initially only one tracker in the list to
which we assign 100% probability. If the estimation be-
gins from an unknown state, we create one tracker per
possible system state and assign them equal probabilities.
Assuming no prior knowledge on the mouse location, we
set the mouse uncertainty area to cover the entire screen
in each tracker during initialization.
The state and location estimation is an event-driven
process. Based on the received user input events, we
update the trackers on the list, create new trackers and
delete trackers from the list. For each mouse move-
ment event, we update the mouse uncertainty area in each
tracker. For every mouse click, we consider all possi-
ble outcomes of the click, including transitions to new
states, as well as remaining in the same state. We create
new child trackers with updated uncertainty areas, add
the children to the list, and remove the parent tracker
from the list (see Figure 5). When we observe a user
event sequence that indicates interaction with a specific
UI element, we update the probabilities of each tracker
accordingly. We explain these steps in detail below.
Movement event handling. When the mouse uncer-
tainty area is the entire device screen, any mouse move-
ment reduces the size of the uncertainty area. For exam-
ple, if the user moves the mouse to the right, the area be-
comes smaller, as the mouse cursor can no longer reside
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Figure 6: Movement event handling. Movement can re-
duce the uncertainty area size (1) and (3) or change its
location (2).
in the leftmost part of the screen (Figure 6). If the mouse
is moved to a direction where the uncertainty area border
is not on the edge of the screen, the mouse movement
does not reduce the size of the uncertainty area, but only
causes its location to be updated. Any mouse movement
towards a direction where the uncertainty area is on the
border of the screen, reduces the size of the uncertainty
area further. For each received mouse movement event,
we update the uncertainty areas in all trackers.
Click event handling. When we observe a mouse
click event, the estimation algorithm considers all possi-
ble outcomes for each tracker. The possible outcomes are
determined by the current mouse uncertainty area (Fig-
ure 7). For each possible outcome we create new child
trackers and update their mouse uncertainty areas as fol-
lows.
If the user interface remains in the same state, the up-
dated mouse area for the child is the original area of the
parent from which we remove the areas of the user in-
put elements that cause transitions to other states. For
each state transition, the mouse area is calculated as the
intersection of the parent area and the area of the user
input element that caused the transition. Once the up-
dated mouse uncertainty areas are calculated for each
child tracker, we remove the parent tracker from the list,
and add the children to it. We repeat the same process
for each state tracker on the list. We note that as a result
of this process, the list may contain multiple trackers for
the same state with different mouse uncertainty areas.
The probability of a child tracker is calculated by mul-
tiplying the probability of its parent with a transition
probability. We consider two options for assigning tran-
sition probabilities, as shown in Figure 8.
• Equal transitions. Our first option is to consider all
possible state transitions equally likely. E.g., if the
mouse uncertainty area contains two buttons, each
of them causing a separate state transition, and parts
of the screen where a click does not cause a state
transition, we assign each of them 1/3 probability.
• Element area. Our second option is to calculate the
transition probabilities based on the surface of the
user interface element covered by the mouse uncer-
tainty area. For example, if the uncertainty area cov-
Figure 7: Click event handling. We create state track-
ers for all possible click outcomes, including remaining
in the same state and transitions to new states. A new
uncertainty area is calculated for each tracker.
Figure 8: Transition probabilities. On the left, all possi-
ble outcomes are considered equally like. On the right,
we illustrate area-based transition probabilities.
ers a larger area over one button than another, we
assign it bigger transition probability.
The transition probabilities can be enhanced with a
priori probabilities of UI element interactions. For ex-
ample, based on prior experience on comparable user in-
terfaces, the adversary can estimate that an OK button is
pressed twice as likely as a cancel button in a given state.
Element detection. Finally, we identify user inter-
action with certain UI elements based on sequences of
observed user input events. For example, a mouse event
sequence that begins with a button down event, followed
by movement left or right that exceeds a given threshold,
followed by a button up event is an indication of slider
usage. Similarly, text input from the keyboard indicates
likely interaction with an editable text field and a click
indicates a likely interaction with a button.
When we observe such event sequences (slider move-
ment, text input, button click), we update the probabil-
ities of the possible trackers on the list. One possible
approach would be to remove all trackers from the list
where interaction with the identified element is not pos-
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sible (e.g., a button click is not possible under the mouse
uncertainty area). After such trackers would be removed
from the list, we could increase the probabilities of the
remaining ones equally. Such an approach could yield
fast results, but also provide erroneous state estimations.
If the user provides text input on a user interface state
that does not contain editable text fields or if text high-
lighting is mistaken for slider movement, the algorithm
would remove the correct state from the list.
We adopt a safer but slower approach where we con-
sider trackers with the identified elements more likely
and scale up their probabilities, and keep the remaining
trackers and scale down their probabilities. The scaling
factor is an adjustable parameter of this approach.
Target state detection. Our algorithm continues the
state tracking process until two criteria are met. First,
we have identified the target state with a probability that
exceeds a given threshold. After each click event and de-
tected element we sum the probabilities for all trackers
that represent the same state to check if any of them ex-
ceeds the threshold. Second, the mouse uncertainty area
must be small enough to launch the attack. We combine
the mouse uncertainty areas from all matching trackers
and consider the uncertainty area sufficiently small when
its size is smaller than the size of the target elements or
the confirmation element.
State estimation for touchscreen. Using a touch-
screen instead of a mouse does not affect our algorithm.
Typically touchscreens report click events in absolute co-
ordinates, hence using a touchscreen corresponds to the
case where the mouse location is known, but the starting
state is not. Determining the possible transitions after a
click is trivial, since there can be at most one intersec-
tion of a clicking point with the area of an element in
a specific state. Furthermore text input can be observed
from the virtual keyboard therefore the element detection
works the same way as described previously.
3.5 Attack Launch Techniques
Once the attack device has identified the attack state with
sufficiently small uncertainty area, it is ready to launch
the attack. In a simple approach, the adversary moves the
mouse cursor over one of the attack elements, modifies
its value, moves the mouse cursor over the confirmation
button, and clicks it. The process is fast and the user has
little chances of preventing the attack. However, the user
is likely to notice such an attack. For example, if a doctor
never clicked the confirm button herself, she is unlikely
to implant the programmed pacemaker into a patient. For
this reason, we focus on more subtle attack launch tech-
niques. Below we describe two such techniques and in
Section 4 we evaluate their user detection.
Element-driven attack. The adversary first identifies
that the user interacts with one of the target elements.
This can be easily done when the mouse uncertainty
area is smaller than the target element. Once the user
has modified the value of the target element, the adver-
sary waits a small period of time and during it tracks the
mouse movement, then quickly moves the mouse cursor
back to the target element, modifies its value, and returns
the mouse cursor to its location. After that, the adversary
lets the legitimate user confirm the safety-critical opera-
tion. The technique only requires little mouse movement,
but the modified value remains visible to the user for a
potentially long time, as the adversary does not know
when the user will confirm the safety-critical operation.
Confirmation-driven attack. The adversary identi-
fies that the system is on the attack state and lets the user
to set the attack element values uninterrupted. When the
user clicks the confirmation button, the attack activates.
The adversary blocks the incoming click event, moves
the mouse cursor over one of the attack elements, mod-
ifies its value, moves the mouse cursor back over the
confirmation button, and then passes the click event to
the target system. After that, the adversary changes the
modified attack element back to its original value. In this
technique, the mouse cursor may have to be moved more,
but the modified attack element settings remain visible to
the user only a very short period of time.
4 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate state and location estimation
performance and report results from an online user study
where we tested how many users would detect our at-
tacks.
4.1 Evaluation Setup
To evaluate the estimator performance and attack detec-
tion we built an application that simulates the user in-
terface of a pacemaker programmer based on publicly
available documentation of an existing cardiac implant
programmer [1]. Such a programmer terminal is used by
doctors to configure medical implant settings. For exam-
ple, when a doctor prepares a pacemaker for implanta-
tion, she configures its settings based on the heart con-
dition of the receiving patient. The terminal can also be
used to monitor the operation of the implant and poten-
tially update its settings. The user interface was designed
for mouse and keyboard use.
The model of this user interface consists of approxi-
mately ten states and contain three types of user input
elements: buttons, text fields and sliders. All state transi-
tions are triggered by button clicks. The attack elements
are the user input elements that are used to configure the
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Figure 9: Our custom cardiac implant programmer
screenshot. The attack and the confirmation elements are
highlighted.
Figure 10: Our evaluation setup. We collected user traces
and tested attack detection online. We evaluated estima-
tor performance on separate implementation offline.
pacemaker settings. Threshold is set using a text field
(keyboard), while amplitude and rate are set using slider
elements (mouse), see Figure 9. All attack elements are
on the same state. The model creation was a manual pro-
cess that took us a few hours.
Evaluation setup. On a real attack scenario, both the
state estimator and the attack launcher would be imple-
mented inside the same attack device (e.g., small don-
gle). To demonstrate the feasibility of hacking in the
blind, we implemented the state estimator and the attack
launching as two separate components(Figure 10). Our
programmer user interface was implemented as a web
application. We used it to collect user traces online. We
evaluated the collected traces on the state estimator of-
fline. Attacks were tested on the browser platform.
We implemented the state and location estimator using
Python and the pacemaker programmer UI using Haxe
language that was compiled to the HTML5 (JavaScript)
backend.
4.2 Trace Collection
To evaluate the tracking algorithm we collected user
traces for the programmer user interface online.
Participant recruitment. We recruited 400 partici-
pants for trace collection using a crowd sourcing plat-
form called CrowdFlower. The platform enables the def-
inition of typically small online jobs that human contrib-
utors complete in return of a small payment. We re-
cruited participants globally and required them to be at
least 18 years old. Each contributor was allowed to com-
plete only one job for trace collection. On CrowdFlower
platform our job had a title “Program an implanted pace-
maker” and its description stated:
We are evaluating the user interface of an ex-
perimental medical device. Your task is to con-
figure a pacemaker device by interacting with
the pacemaker programming software. Note
that this is a test! The shown user interface
is not connected to a real patient.
Task details. In each job, we asked the participants to
fill in a short questionnaire that we used to collect demo-
graphic information. The questionnaire included also a
test question, with a known answer, that we used to filter
out participants that were clearly not attentive. After the
questionnaire, the participants were shown more detailed
task instructions and the pacemaker programmer user in-
terface. The participants interacted with the user inter-
face using a mouse and a keyboard on their browsers.
In the instructions we asked the participant to find
saved patient data that matches a given medical condi-
tion, copy that patient’s pacemaker settings to the pro-
gramming screen, and finally, to program the device by
pressing the confirmation element. The full instructions
are listed in Appendix A. They remained visible to the
participant while she interacted with the programmer UI.
We recorded all user input during the task, but no private
information on study participants was collected.
Trace analysis. In total 400 contributors completed
the task, Table 4 in Appendix A shows their demograph-
ics. We divided the collected traces randomly into 200
training traces and 200 evaluation traces. We analyzed
all the training traces. The time required to complete
the task varied greatly. On the average the traces had 29
(±22) clicks and 98% of the traces had at least ten clicks.
We profiled each user interface state and calculated how
often each button was pressed. We analyzed also condi-
tional button press frequencies, i.e., how often a button
was pressed given that the user transitioned to the cur-
rent state from a given previous state. By analyzing the
traces, we observed that approximately 7% of user input
gestures were over wrong or non-existent elements. For
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Figure 11: State tracking accuracy. On the left, tracking from a known state. The uncertainty area reduces fast. After
ten clicks, we estimate the correct state with high probability. On the right, tracking from an unknown start state. The
uncertainty area reduces slower and we estimate the correct state with slightly lower probability.
example, users clicked when the mouse cursor was not
over a button element.
4.3 Estimation Accuracy
We ran our estimation algorithm (implemented in
Python) on all our evaluation traces. As our algorithm
is event-based, after each click we measured (a) the size
of the mouse uncertainty area, expressed as the percent-
age of the overall screen size, and (b) the probability that
we correctly estimate the real state the user was currently
in. Figure 11 shows our results.
We say that our algorithm correctly estimates the cur-
rent state, when it assigns the highest probability for the
correct state among all states. As all our traces start
from the same state, to evaluate the situation where the
tracking begins from an unknown state, we cut the first
10% from all our evaluation traces. As tracking op-
tions we used the element-area transition probabilities
together with element detection (scaling parameter 0.95)
and a priori probabilities that we obtained by profiling
the training traces.
First, we discuss the case where the state tracking
begins from a known start state (shown left in Fig-
ure 11). The uncertainty area is the full screen at first and
the probability for estimating the correct state is 100%
(known start state). As the estimation algorithm gath-
ers more user input events, the uncertainty area size re-
duces quickly and already after three clicks the area is
less than 1% of the screen size. The estimation proba-
bility decreases first, as the first click adds uncertainty
to the tracking process, but after additional click events,
the estimation probability increases steadily, and after ten
clicks the algorithm can estimate the correct state with
above 90% probability.
Next, we consider the scenario where the state track-
ing begins from an unknown target system state (shown
right in Figure 11). In the beginning, the uncertainty area
is the entire screen and the probability for the state esti-
mate is low, as all states are equally likely. As the track-
ing algorithm gathers more user events, the uncertainty
area reduces, but not as fast as in the case of known start
state. The uncertainty area becomes less than 1% of the
screen size after eight clicks. The probability for the cor-
rect state estimate increases and after ten clicks we can
estimate the correct state with approximately 90% prob-
ability. We do not report uncertainty area and state prob-
ability past ten clicks, as many of our traces were not
longer than that.
We conclude that in both cases we can identify the cor-
rect system state with high probability after observing
only ten clicks and the uncertainty area becomes very
small (below 1%, equal to a small, 50×50 pixel rectan-
gle). In our case study user interface the target and the
confirmation elements are significantly larger than 1% of
the screen size. If the user enters the attack state after ten
clicks, we can launch the attack accurately. This was true
in 96% of our traces.
Tracking option comparison. We compared the per-
formance of our different tracking options. We evaluated
two transaction probability assignment schemes (equal
transactions and element area) and tested both schemes
with and without element detection and a priori proba-
bilities. We measured the probability that we estimate
the correct state after ten clicks, Table 1 shows the re-
sults. We notice that the equal transitions option per-
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Transition
probability
+element
detection
+a priori
probability
Known state
equal trans. 34% 96% 94%
element area 27% 96% 95%
Unknown state
equal trans. 52% 90% 91%
element area 44% 90% 90%
Table 1: Tracking option comparison. We report the cor-
rect state probability after ten clicks in each option.
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Figure 12: State tracking overhead. The tracking over-
head per user input event increases over time as the state
tracking algorithm accumulates more trackers.
formed slightly better than the area based probability as-
signment. Element detection gives a major detection ac-
curacy improvement. A priori probabilities do not im-
prove accuracy significantly. The correct state probabil-
ity is higher when we analyze traces with unknown start
state, but the mouse uncertainty is significantly larger
than in the known starting state samples.
Touchscreen tracking. We also tested how accurately
our algorithm could detect the correct state on a touch-
screen scenario that has state uncertainty, but no loca-
tion uncertainty. We used our evaluation traces that were
collected from mouse and keyboard input, neglected the
movement information and enhanced the click and drag
events with absolute coordinates. We kept the text input,
assuming that the adversary can collect text input from
touchscreen virtual keyboard. We processed the mod-
ified traces using the equal transitions option, a priori
probabilities and element detection starting the tracking
from an unknown state. After five clicks, we were able
to detect the correct state with 99% probability.
4.4 Estimation Overhead
To analyze how fast our state and location estimation al-
gorithm runs, we measured the runtime overhead of pro-
cessing each user input event. Using the acquired traces,
our algorithm (implemented in Python) was run on a
standard desktop (Intel iCore 5, 3.4 GHz, 16 GB RAM)
with all the tracking options enabled using element area
transition probabilities. The processing delay is the time
our algorithm takes to process a single mouse click event,
and this processing delay is related to the number of state
trackers that our algorithm maintains.
Figure 12 shows the results. When we start track-
ing from a known state, the overhead increases slightly
over time, but remains under 10 milliseconds per event.
When we start tracking from an unknown state, the algo-
rithm accumulates significantly more trackers, and thus
the processing overhead increases faster. After ten clicks,
processing a single input event takes approximately 50
milliseconds on our test platform.
We conclude that the performance requirements of the
tracking algorithm are moderate for simple user inter-
faces where the operations are typically completed with
small number of clicks. In Section 6 we discuss the per-
formance requirements and possible optimization tech-
niques for more complex UIs and longer tracking ses-
sions.
4.5 Attack Detection User Study
To evaluate how many users would detect ours attacks,
we conducted a second user study online.
Recruitment and procedure. We created a new
job on the same crowd sourcing platform with similar
description and recruited 1200 new study participants.
We divided the participants into 12 equally large attack
groups of 100 participants each. We tested two element-
driven attack variants: one where we modify a text in-
put element and another we we modify a slider input
element. We also tested two confirmation-driven attack
variants: one with text and another with slider input. For
each four attack variant we tested three separate speeds
of the attack. We demonstrate the confirmation-driven
attack variant that modifies a slider at 10 ms speed in a
video that is available online.1
For all participants, we provided the same task de-
scription as before, but depending on the group, we
launched an attack during the task. Once the task was
over, we asked the participants: “Do you think you pro-
grammed the pacemaker correctly?” with yes/no answer
options. We also asked the participants to give freeform
feedback on the task.
If a participant noticed the UI manipulation, she had
three possible ways to act on it. First, the participant was
able to program the pacemaker again with the correct val-
ues. Second, the participant could report that the device
was not programmed correctly in the post-test question.
Third, the participant could write to the freeform feed-
back that she noticed something suspicious in the appli-
cation user interface.
Study results. In total 987 participants completed the
task and we report their demographics in Table 5 (Ap-
pendix A). We consider that the attack succeeded when
1https://goo.gl/rzCX3o
10
Attack
group
Attack
succeeded
Task
completed
1. Element, text, 5 ms 50% 84
2. Element, text, 62 ms 37% 84
3. Element, text, 125 ms 48% 86
4. Element, slider, 5 ms 12% 80
5. Element, slider, 62 ms 9% 83
6. Element, slider, 125 ms 6% 86
7. Confirmation, text, 10 ms 93% 81
8. Confirmation, text, 125 ms 96% 79
9. Confirmation, text, 250 ms 93% 78
10. Confirmation, slider, 10 ms 95% 85
11. Confirmation, slider, 125 ms 90% 82
12. Confirmation, slider, 250 ms 95% 79
Total 987
Table 2: Attack detection study results. For each attack
group we report the the percentage of users against which
the attack succeeded, and the number of participants that
completed the task.
the participant did none of the above mentioned three
actions. The results are shown in Table 2. The suc-
cess rate for the element-driven text attacks was 37-50%
and for the element-driven slider attacks 6-12%, depend-
ing on the speed of the attack. The success rate for the
confirmation-driven text attacks was 93-96% and for the
confirmation-driven slider attacks 90-95%.
To compare the different types of attacks, we per-
formed chi-squared tests of independence. First, we
compared all the element-driven attacks to confirmation-
driven attacks. As can be clearly seen from the re-
sults, the success rate in the confirmation-driven attacks
was significantly higher (χ2(1,N = 987) = 450.7), p <
0.001). Then we compared the attacks that modify
text value to attacks that modify a slider value. In
the element-driven attacks, text field manipulation had
a higher success rate than slider movement (χ2(1,N =
503) = 78.1), p< 0.001), but in the confirmation-driven
attacks the type of the manipulated user interface ele-
ment had no effect on the attack success rate (χ2(1,N =
484) = 0.12), p= 0.73).
Finally, we tested the effect of the attack speed and
found that in none of the tested four attack types, the
speed of the attack had a significant effect on the suc-
cess rate. We report the test values for the element-driven
text attacks (χ2(2,N = 254) = 3.56), p= 0.17), element-
driven slider attacks (χ2(2,N = 249) = 1.21), p= 0.54),
confirmation-driven text attacks (χ2(1,N = 238) =
0.42), p = 0.81), and confirmation-driven slider attacks
(χ2(2,N = 246) = 2.20), p= 0.33).
We conclude that all the tested confirmation-driven at-
tacks are very stealthy, in each variant the success rate
was at least 90%. In the element-driven attacks that
user interface manipulation remains visible longer for the
user, and this is a possible explanation why the attacks
do not succeed equally well. However, our user study
was not designed to prove or reject such hypothesis. In-
terestingly, we notice that in the confirmation-driven at-
tacks, the attack variants of speed 250 milliseconds did
not have significantly lower success rates than the faster
attacks. This implies that the adversary has at least a few
hundred milliseconds time to perform the user interface
manipulation without sacrificing its success rate.
Discussion. We analyzed the freeform text responses
from all users, and none of the users associated the ob-
served UI changes to a malicious attack. Only two users
commented on the changing values of UI elements and
both attributed the changes to a software glitch. One user
noted “Possible bug when working with sliders. Thresh-
old value changed from 88 back to 80, had to correct”.
This result shows that users are habituated to software
errors in application user interfaces.
Out of the 987 study participants only 21 answered
negatively to the question “Do you think you pro-
grammed the pacemaker correctly?”. A possible expla-
nation is that users misinterpreted the results of positive
UI feedback. To reduce chances of errors, it is common
for safety-critical systems to have strong positive feed-
back mechanisms (e.g., clearly visible user action notifi-
cations). Even though an attack was performed, the users
could have been fooled into believing that nothing out of
the ordinary happened by the benign and reassuring na-
ture of our “Device Programmed” notification. A user
remarked: “I was told at the end that the pacemaker was
programmed, so I assume I did it correctly”.
5 Countermeasures
Trusted input devices. One way to address our attacks is
to mandate usage of trusted input devices. We call a user
input device trusted, when it securely shares a key with
the target system. For example, USB input devices com-
municate using polling. The host sends periodic requests
and the input device sends responses that report a possi-
bly occurred user event. With a shared key all request and
responses can be encrypted and authenticated which pre-
vents the adversary from observing and injecting events.
If the responses also include a freshness guarantee, such
as a nonce, the adversary cannot replay events either.
However, secure deployment of trusted input devices
is challenging. Assuming that the target system and the
input device have a certified key, and the two devices
run a mutually authenticated key agreement protocol at
connection establishment. If the certified input device is
temporarily unavailable (e.g., lost or broken), the safety-
critical terminal cannot be operated with another, non-
certified device. For example, doctors need be able to
operate medical terminals at all times. Additionally, the
adversary can purchase a certified input device, extract
a key from it, and install it to the attack device. Stan-
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dard approaches to address compromised keys, such as
online revocation checks, are ill-suited to this setting,
as many safety-critical embedded terminals are discon-
nected from the Internet to limit their attack surface.
Increased user feedback. The user interface can pro-
vide visual feedback on each change on attack elements
[7]. For example, the user interface can draw a thick bor-
der around a recently edited element and keep it visible
for a pre-determined amount of time. In a confirmation-
driven attack, the user would see the border, but because
the adversary changes the attack element value back to
the original, the content of the user interface element
would appear as expected. Understanding that something
malicious happened may not be easy for the user.
Change rate limiting. The user interface could limit
rate at which the values of the user interface input ele-
ments can be changed. However, our study results show
that the majority of the users do not notice even relatively
slow UI manipulations that take 250 milliseconds. Find-
ing a rate limit that efficiently prevents user interface ma-
nipulation attacks, but does not prevent legitimate user
interactions can be challenging.
Randomized user interfaces. Another way to ad-
dress our attacks is to randomize parts of the safety-
critical system user interface. Both our state tracking al-
gorithm and the attack launch techniques assume a static
model of the target system user interface. If the user in-
put elements change their location for every execution,
the system state tracking becomes significantly harder.
Also attack launch can be complicated by using ran-
domized element locations. Randomized user interfaces
have been proposed for smartphone screen lock to pre-
vent shoulder surfing and smudge attacks [17, 18]. The
Intel IPT technology randomizes PIN input to prevent
malware from stealing it [8].
While UI randomization can complicate, or even pre-
vent, our attacks, it also increases the chances of human
error. In contrast to smartphone screen lock, on safety-
critical terminals an increased error rate is typically not
acceptable. For example, medical device evaluations
consider lack of UI consistency a critical safety violation
[6]. Randomization can increase attack resistance, and
thus improve safety, but at the same time incerase human
errors, and thus decrease safety. Finding the optimum is
an interesting direction for further research, but outside
the scope of this paper.
Human user tests. Passwords are often used to au-
thenticate that the correct user is interacting with a com-
puting system. Passwords do not protect against our at-
tacks, because the adversary can learn any entered pass-
words. CAPTCHAs are a common technique to verify
that the user input originates from a human. In our sce-
nario, the attack device cannot solve a CAPTCHA, as it
Attack type CAPTCHA placement
Confirmation Element mod.
confirmation-driven attack possible attack prevented
element-driven attack possible visibility increased
Table 3: Placement options for human user tests.
cannot read from the screen, and observing the user to
solve one test does not help in future tests.
The terminal user interface can require that the user
must solve a human user test to confirm the safety-critical
operation. This approach does not prevent element-
driven attacks. Once the adversary has detected interac-
tion with the attack elements, it can wait, modify their
values, and after that let the user to complete the test
in order to confirm the operation. Also confirmation-
driven attacks remain possible with this approach. The
user can also be asked to solve a test to be allowed to
modify the attack elements. This prevents confirmation-
driven attacks. When the user chooses to confirm the
safety-critical operation, the adversary cannot return to
the attack elements and modify their values without user
involvement. For element-driven attacks the adversary
has to adjust his attack strategy. The adversary must per-
form the modification when the user interacts with one
of the attack elements (and not shortly after it). Table 3
summarizes these options.
Human user tests can improve attack resistance, but
forcing the user to solve such a test for every modifica-
tion of a safety-critical UI element is not be acceptable
in many systems we consider.
Continuous user authentication. While traditional
user authentication systems require the user to log in
once, continuous authentication systems monitor user in-
put over a period of time to detect if the observed us-
age deviates from a previously recorded user profile.
Many such systems track mouse velocity, acceleration
and movement direction [13, 15, 2], together with click
events [15, 2], angle-based curvature metrics and click-
pause measurements [20]. Typically these systems col-
lect user input events for a fixed period of time and then
analyze the input to detect unauthorized usage.
The proposed systems that demonstrate low false re-
jection rates, typically require a significant number of
consecutive impostor actions (e.g., 20 consecutive mouse
clicks [20] or 70 consecutive mouse actions [11]). Even
when tailored for higher false rejection rates, the systems
need to observe the impostor for significant amount of
time (e.g., 12 consecutive seconds [14]). Our attacks re-
quire only brief mouse movement and one or few clicks,
and the attacks can be performed well under a second.
Our state estimation works fully passively. Thus, the cur-
rent continuous authentication systems are not directly
applicable to detection of our attacks.
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Summary. We conclude that all the reviewed coun-
termeasures have major limitations. Finding better pro-
tective measures that are both effective and practical to
deploy remains an open problem.
6 Discussion
User study validity. To evaluate the performance of our
state tracking algorithm, we collected user traces online.
We also evaluated attack detection online. Our study par-
ticipants were not domain experts and they had no prior
experience on the tested UI. Thus, their observed behav-
ior may not match the one of the real terminal user. Test-
ing our attacks in a real scenario is not safe. However,
a controlled lab study on a real terminal and domain ex-
perts would provide more confidence to our results.
User interface complexity. We experimented our at-
tacks on a user interface that consists of approximately
ten states. We consider this typical UI complexity for
embedded dedicated-purpose terminals. If our approach
were to be used on applications with more complex UIs,
the state tracking process becomes more challenging and
computationally intensive, as the amount of uncertainty
and the number of state trackers increase. Evaluating our
attack approach on more complex UIs would be an inter-
esting direction for further work. Our focus is on embed-
ded terminals and simple UIs.
Non-deterministic user interfaces. In this work we
focus on deterministic interfaces where the same element
click always transits to the same, pre-defined UI state.
However, embedded terminals can have more complex
UIs where this is not the case. For example, clicking
a button can lead to different states, depending on the
values in the current state. Our attack can be extended to
encompass such cases as well.
Building the attack device. In our proof-of-concept
implementation, the state estimation and the attack com-
ponents were decoupled, and were implemented and
evaluated separately. We envision a real attack device
to be a small, constrained dongle with, e.g., the process-
ing capabilities of a low-end modern smartphone. Even
though our tracking algorithm was implemented in unop-
timized Python code, the processing delay on our setup
was very low (under 50ms). The processing delay on
the real attack device would likely be higher, however,
as long as the processing delay is shorter than the time
needed for a user to perform two consecutive state tran-
sitions, our algorithm can track the user in real time. We
analyzed all our traces and we found that 95% of inter-
click times are larger than 1000ms, which gives ample
time to run an optimized version of the algorithm even
on constrained devices. Furthermore, the attack device
only needs to track all possible states until it becomes
fairly certain about the current state. The device can then
discard all but one (the most likely) tracker, and restart
tracking — the processing delay does not accumulate.
The attack launching would incur little computational re-
quirements on the attack device.
7 Related Work
USB attacks. Key loggers are small devices that the ad-
versary can attach between a keyboard and the target sys-
tem. The key logger records user input and the adversary
collects the device back later to learn any entered user
secrets such as passwords. Such attacks are limited to
passive information leakage, while our approach enables
active runtime attacks with severe safety implications.
A malicious user input device, or a smartphone that
impersonates one [19], can attack PC platforms by exe-
cuting pre-programmed attack sequences [3, 5, 9]. For
example, a malicious keyboard can issue dedicated key
sequence to open a terminal and execute malicious sys-
tem commands. The input device might also be able to
copy malicious code to the target system. Such attacks
are typically not possible on hardened embedded termi-
nals where the user cannot escape the application UI, and
installation and execution of unsigned code is prevented.
Terminal protection. Power analysis can be used
to identify unknown (malicious) software processes run-
ning on embedded terminals, such as medical devices
[4]. Such approaches would not detect our attack where
no malicious code is running on the embedded terminal.
User interface attacks. In systems where multiple
applications or websites share the same display, the user
can be tricked to interact with false UI elements. For
example, a malicious website may be able to draw an
overlay over a button that causes the user click the but-
ton unintentionally. Such attacks are called clickjacking
[7] or UI redressing [12]. In our attack scenario, the ad-
versary can only modify and injects user events.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a new way to attack
safety-critical, hardened terminals. In the attack, the ad-
versary installs an attack device between a user input de-
vice and the terminal, and the attack is launched when
the authorized user is performing a safety-critical oper-
ation, by modifying or injecting new user input events.
Our approach is easy to deploy on the location, invisi-
ble to traditional malware detection, and difficult for the
user to notice. Many of the attack variants we tested had
success rate over 90%. We analyzed several countermea-
sures and noticed that all of them have limitations. We
conclude that our attack presents a serious threat to many
safety-critical terminals.
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A Supplementary Material
Instructions text. Your task is to program a pacemaker
with the correct settings. The programmer is already
connected to the pacemaker.
1. Find the data of the patient which was diagnosed
with atherosclerosis.
2. By clicking the “Program Pacemaker” button, pro-
gram the pacemaker with the settings (“Threshold”,
“Amplitude”, “Rate”) of that patient.
3. Click “Complete Task ”.
Age
18-29 40.86%
30-39 41.19%
40-49 12.52%
50-59 3.95%
60 or above 1.48%
Gender
Male 74.14%
Female 25.86%
Education
Primary school 2.47%
High school 31.63%
Bachelor 65.90%
Table 4: User trace collection demographics.
Age
18-29 41.64%
30-39 38.84%
40-49 13.51%
50-59 4.20%
60 or above 1.80%
Gender
Male 69.87%
Female 30.13%
Education
Primary school 2.10%
High school 30.03%
Bachelor 67.87%
Table 5: Attack detection study demographics.
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